The Spanish Proposal to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union by Moreiro González, Carlos J.
The EuropeanOmbudsman
Origins, Establishment, Evolution
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
Luxembourg
© 2005 The European Ombudsman and the authors
All rights reserved.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the individual authors.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided
that the source is acknowledged.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005
ISBN 92-95022-85-8
Printed in Belgium
PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER
Introduction
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros 1
1 Trends Leading to the Establishment of 
a European Ombudsman
Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen 13
2 The Spanish Proposal to the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union
Carlos Moreiro González 27
3 The Danish Proposal to the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union
Peter Biering 38
4 The Process of Drafting the European 
Ombudsman’s Statute
Ezio Perillo 52
5 The Early Years of the European Ombudsman
Jacob Söderman 83
6 The European Ombudsman: Protecting Citizens’ 
Rights and Strengthening Parliamentary Scrutiny
Paul Magnette 106
Contents
7 Parallel Functions and Co-operation: 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions and 
the European Ombudsman
Saverio Baviera 126
8 The Policy-Relationship between the European 
Ombudsman and the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Petitions
Eddy Newman 143
9 Safeguarding the Rights of European Citizens: 
the European Commission Working with 
the European Ombudsman
Anita Gradin and Ranveig Jacobsson 162
10 The European Commission’s Internal Procedure 
for Dealing with the European Ombudsman’s Inquiries
Jean-Claude Eeckhout and Philippe Godts 167
11 Special Reports Submitted by the European 
Ombudsman to the European Parliament
Roy Perry 185
12 Holding the Administration Accountable in Respect 
of its Discretionary Powers: the Roles and Approaches 
of the Court, the Parliament and 
the European Ombudsman
Gregorio Garzón Clariana 191
13 The European Ombudsman’s Resources - 
the Budget and Related Issues
Juan Manuel Fabra Vallès 210
14 Reflections on the Future Role of the Ombudsman in 
a Changing Europe
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros 217
iv Contents
Annex I: Key Documents and References 241
Annex II: The Spanish Proposal for 
a European Ombudsman 249
Annex III: The Danish Proposal for 
a European Ombudsman 252
Annex IV: The Treaty Basis for the European Ombudsman 254
Annex V: The Statute of the European Ombudsman 256
Contributors 264
Contents v
1 Introduction
This study analyses the background, content and legal effect of the
Spanish contribution to the Intergovernmental Conference on
Political Union (IGC-PU), which adopted the creation of the
European Ombudsman in the Treaty on European Union (TEU,
1992).
A favourable climate came about for the creation of this suprana-
tional body when two different ideas concerning the process of
Community integration came together in the last decade of the 20th
century: the federalist perspective of the Belgian, Greek and Spanish
governments, and the euro-scepticism of the Danish government.
The task of defining the legal model succeeded in this exceptional
political climate, despite the strong reservations of the more suprana-
tional institutions, the European Parliament and the European
Commission, which were unwilling or unable to see at the time how
useful the new body would be in galvanising efficiency and demo-
cracy within the context of the European Union’s unfolding institu-
tional dynamic.
While the Spanish Government contributed to the eventual success
of the creation of the Ombudsman, this was more due to the exis-
tence of political will favouring creation of the institution rather than
to the legal feasibility of the model set out in the Spanish proposals
to the Intergovernmental Conference.
CHAPTER 2 
The Spanish Proposal to the
Intergovernmental Conference on
Political Union
Carlos Moreiro González
2 The Context of the Spanish Contribution
The proposal was originally influenced by two elements: the political
approach to the integration process of Felipe González, the Spanish
Prime Minister at the time, and the legal form of the Ombudsman in
the 1978 Spanish Constitution.
The Madrid European Council, which called the IGC for the sign-
ing of the Maastricht Treaty, set objectives concerning only the eco-
nomic and monetary integration of the Member States of the
European Economic Community 1.
It was soon realised, however, that it was risky to deepen
Community institutional action in the economic sphere without a
firm political anchorage among the citizens of the Member States.
The creation of a “European public space” to transcend the mere
notion of the citizen as the one to whom supranational law is
addressed assumed its own specific importance during the debate
leading up to the beginning of the Intergovernmental Conference 2.
In a letter dated 4 May 1990, addressed to the Irish Prime Minister
(President-in-Office of the Council), Felipe González advocated the
creation of a “common citizenship” which would make citizens the
protagonists in the integration process, even though the rights to be
attached to the new Community legal status had not yet been
defined 3.
The political climate had already been prepared by the “aide-
memoire” of 26 March 1990 from the Belgian Government, addressed
to the Council, which referred to ‘the citizens’ Europe’ as one of the
issues that should be included on the Agenda for the IGC. In gener-
al terms, the Belgian Government was referring to free movement,
drawing up a declaration on human rights, and exercising the right
to vote in local and European Parliament elections 4.
In any case, the very political notion that was essential to the cre-
ation of the status of European citizenship constituted, for at least
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1 26-27 June 1989, EC Bulletin, 6-1989, pp. 8-17, Point I.1.11, p. 12.
2 P. Solbes Mira, “La citoyenneté européenne”, Revue du marché commun et de l'Union
européenne, 345, 1991, pp. 168 ff.
3 Text published in Revista de Instituciones Europeas, 1990-3, pp. 780-781. The Greek
Government issued a memorandum supporting Prime Minister González’s letter
on 18 May 1990, in which it gave its own proposals regarding the notion of
European citizenship and citizens’ rights in the future ‘European Community’; 
SI (90), p. 393.
4 SI (90), p. 232.
two reasons, the basis that would later support, if not justify, the cre-
ation of the European Ombudsman. Firstly, because much in the
same way as this institution is regarded as one of the essential ingre-
dients of contemporary constitutionalism, its acceptance at the
supranational level formed part of the constitutionalisation of
Europe. Secondly, because, once it was in operation, it would
strengthen citizens’ confidence in the European Union’s institutional
mechanisms, by giving them a new channel for monitoring those
mechanisms.
Underlying the Spanish proposal was also the legal concept of the
Ombudsman coined in Article 54 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution
and Organic Law 3/1981 (6 April) on the Defensor del Pueblo (LODP),
amended by Organic Law 2/1992 (5 March) (Boletín Oficial del Estado,
6 March 1992), which, in summary, establish a constitutional body 5
that is independent and exercises monitoring on two fronts (admin-
istrative activities and fundamental rights). Since it served as back-
ground for what eventually emerged as the Spanish proposal to the
IGC, a brief description of its salient features and powers within the
Spanish legal order is warranted.
In this sense, Article 9 of the LODP allows subsidiary monitoring of
acts of “maladministration”, except for the judicial function of the
administration of justice (Article 117 of the 1978 Spanish
Constitution, and Articles 13 and 17 of the LODP), and acts of the
Head of State.
The active legal standing of the Ombudsman therefore enables him
to act via claims of unconstitutionality and actions for infringement
of fundamental rights and bring civil liability actions (Article 162.1 of
the 1978 Spanish Constitution and Article 26 of the LODP respec-
tively).
In addition to the extensive legal capacity recognised in the Spanish
legal order, the Ombudsman also has a considerable degree of oper-
ational autonomy expressly recognised in Article 6.1 of the LODP.
Therefore, although he is appointed by Parliament, he may only be
dismissed by the same body for “clearly neglecting to fulfil the obli-
gations and duties of the position” (Article 5.4 of the LODP).
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5 Although the Spanish Ombudsman does not have a constitutional function of cre-
ating law, the institution is expressly provided for in the Constitution and, through
its functions, has an important position in the constitutional system.
However, both in his appearances before the Spanish Joint Congress-
Senate Committee and in the annual report to the plenary session of
Parliament, his actions are not put to the vote, adopted or rejected,
nor are any opinions issued on them.
The Spanish legal order establishes a generous framework for pro-
viding subjective and objective access to the Ombudsman. Based on
some minimum requirements for legitimacy laid down in Article 15.1
of the LODP, “…any claim made to the Ombudsman by an individ-
ual or group of people requesting his intervention in order to obtain
clarification of an act or decision of a Public Authority, his agents and
administrative authorities” 6 is accepted as a complaint. The com-
plaint or claim must, however, “directly concern” the plaintiff (Article
10 of the LODP), a requirement that does not prevent claims from
being made in order to protect so-called “diffuse rights”.
This legal framework designed to ensure the strength and effective-
ness of the Ombudsman is certainly partly due to the fact that con-
temporary Spanish constitutionalism places little emphasis on exer-
cising the right of petition in a decentralised State 7.
There was specific internal legislative action with regard to the
decentralisation of government administration in order to specify 
the extent of the Ombudsman’s powers 8. Article 2 of Law 36/1985 
(6 November) establishes a system of powers that are “exclusive” and
“concurrent” with its counterparts in the Autonomous
Communities 9.
It is not difficult to imagine that the transposition of this constitu-
tional system into the Spanish proposal submitted to the IGC was
more an act of political will than one of legal realism. The proposal
was scarcely viable for several reasons. The first was that the
Community institutional system does not exactly reflect the tradi-
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6 Ombudsman’s Management Report to the plenary session of the Spanish
Parliament, 27 September 1984, p. 24.
7 The bulk of monitoring of the executive by Parliament is done through formal
questions in Parliament, appearances, investigation committees and debates on
budgets.
8 According to Article 54 of the Constitution and Article 12.2 of the LODP, the
Ombudsman’s powers cover “all the activities of the Administration”.
9 The Spanish Ombudsman has the sole authority to monitor the activities of the
State Public Administration Bodies that act within the Autonomous Communities.
A co-operation system was established enabling these bodies to assist the
Ombudsman when asked to do so, and to receive complaints that may subse-
quently be referred to the Spanish Ombudsman, if they fall within his remit.
tional division of powers in a democratic State, which is the ombuds-
man’s “natural habitat”.
The second reason was that the lack of a list of the fundamental and
administrative rights of Community citizens meant that there was no
objective basis to justify the creation of a “constitutional body” at the
supranational level.
Finally, a third reason lies in the decentralised nature of the
Community administration, which, as a result, does not have a power-
ful administrative apparatus that directly and specifically affects the sub-
jective situations of the majority of the citizens in the Member States.
3 The Content of the Contribution
The contribution of the Spanish delegation to the IGC consisted of
two main documents: the Note on citizenship submitted just before
the start of the IGC, on 24 September 1990 (“The road to European
citizenship”) 10, and the proposal for a text on European citizenship
presented to the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union
on 20 February 1991 11.
3.1 The Note on citizenship 
The Note on citizenship considered complaints to a “European
Ombudsman” to be among the mechanisms for guaranteeing the
new concept of ‘European citizenship’ 12 (Point II(e)).
Although it established that citizens should have their specific rights
protected through “petitions or complaints” to the Ombudsman 13,
this right was not included among the “special basic (or fundamen-
tal)” rights of citizens, that is, free movement, free choice of place of
establishment and political participation in that place.
The content of the Note sent a clear federal constitutional message
that the inclusion of freedom of movement and establishment in the
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10 SN 3940/90.
11 Revista de Instituciones Europeas, 1991-1, pp. 405-409.
12 Defined in point I, paragraph four, as “the individual and inseparable status of
nationals of the Member States, who by their membership of the Union are sub-
ject to special rights and duties concerning the Union...”
13 It also establishes that the European Ombudsman may act through the
‘Ombudsmen’ or equivalent figures in the various Member States.
Treaties was to serve as the cornerstone for the future model of polit-
ical integration. Consequently, both the creation of an ombudsman
and granting citizens access to him were only incidental (or addition-
al) elements, which could well have been lost during the negotiations
at the IGC on Political Union, if serious difficulties were encountered
in arriving at an agreement among the delegations.
In principle, the Spanish Note received lukewarm acceptance. In its
mandatory Opinion of 21 October 1990 14, the Commission openly
supported it (Point III.2), although the list of the fundamental ele-
ments that would make up the future Statute of European citizenship
made no reference to the right of access to the Ombudsman.
In the same way, in its resolution on the Martin report 15, the
European Parliament asked for the political notion of citizenship to
be incorporated into the Treaty, without advocating a specific legal
articulation of rights and freedoms.
The only record of explicit support for the creation of the
Ombudsman was in the Danish memorandum on Political Union of
10 October 1990 16.
More importantly, the Presidency Conclusions of the Rome
European Council (14/15 December 1990), prior to the IGC, set the
mood for the future negotiations by taking on board the notion of cit-
izenship and inviting the Conference to look at creating a European
Ombudsman 17.
3.2 The proposal for a text on European citizenship 
The proposal for a text on European citizenship presented to the
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (IGC-PU), on 20
February 1991, set out in more detail the legal and operational
aspects of the European Ombudsman.
The content of Article 2 of the Proposal was in principle particular-
ly striking, as paragraph 1 stated, firstly, that the Union and its
Member States shall respect the fundamental rights recognised by
their constitutional traditions and by the European Convention for
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14 COM (90) 600 final.
15 Doc. A3-281/90.
16 SI (90) 751. Also in the Non-Paper of the Friends of the Presidency Group, SI (90)
963.
17 EC Bulletin, 12-1990; p. 17.
the Protection of Human Rights and, secondly, that the Union takes
on (in terms of inclusion in the acquis) this Convention 18. In addition
to these statements was the ambitious innovation in paragraph 2
which gave the Union the task of establishing the system whereby cit-
izens of the Union and those who did not have that status “may avail
themselves of the rights guaranteed” in Article 2.1 19.
This provision links with the powers (or scope of competence) given
to the European Ombudsman in Article 9 of the Spanish Proposal,
which implied an extension or implicit recognition of the capacity of
the Ombudsman to monitor the respect for fundamental rights in
Community administrative acts. It also extended the subjective
scope by granting non-citizens access to the Ombudsman.
However, its general wording (since it does not propose a precise
relationship with fundamental rights for citizens of the Union) con-
trasts with the recognition of specific citizenship rights in Articles 4
to 9 of the same Proposal.
There are various evaluations that can be made of the content of
Article 9. The proposed body is defined using three alternatives, one
main and two subsidiary ones. Firstly, the text of Article 9 refers to
the “appointment” in each Member State of a “Mediator”that would
be politically accountable to the European Parliament through “soft
law” monitoring, that is, the submission of an annual report.
Alternatively, two other possibilities could be considered: the cre-
ation of a “European Ombudsman” which could be an independent
body of the Union or be accountable to the European Parliament; or
the creation of a European “Ombudsman” to reinforce the action of
the national “mediators”.
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18 These statements were certainly difficult to fit in with the Community’s legal situ-
ation at that time. Firstly, the statement that each Member State would respect the
constitutional traditions of the other Member States was ambiguous. Secondly, the
statement that the Union “took on” (or adopted) the European Convention was
also vague, as this could take place through a classic ‘international succession’
from the Union to its Member States, or by the Union signing the Convention.
Finally, Article 2 of the TEU included respect by the Union for fundamental rights
in very similar terms to those in the Spanish proposal, although it reproduces the
content of the Preamble of the Single European Act, in any case excluding Article B
of the TEU and Articles 8 - 8E of the TEC from the Statute on citizenship. This
provision proved to be more appropriate and was therefore included in the EU’s
principles and objectives.
19 It should be pointed out that this wording was subsequently endorsed by the
Proposal of the European Parliament to the IGC: Recital G of the Resolution of
14 June 1991 (DOC. PE A3-139/91, Official Journal 1991, C 183 p. 362), and docu-
ment CON-UP-UEM 2010/91, R/LIMITE.
The first model would generally give the national “mediators”
appointed in each Member State the broadest capacity to monitor
compliance with Community law at the domestic level. Such an
ambitious proposal was difficult to implement, particularly consider-
ing that not all the Member States have a mediator with national
jurisdiction, or that they may not all be aware of the concept of a
mediator. Consequently it would have been difficult to reconcile the
introduction of this type of body into the constitutional systems of
the Member States with the requirement to respect their national
identities (Article 6.3 TEU).
This is why the two other alternatives were then produced, without,
however, clearly setting out the model, since creating an independent
European Ombudsman (with the level of autonomy enjoyed, for
example, by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank),
and making him accountable to the European Parliament (turning
him “de facto” into a committee of Parliament) are two quite different
things. What would be even more difficult would be to create a resid-
ual body whose function would be to “perfect” the work of the
national mediators.
The lack of precision characteristic of the model contained in the
Spanish proposal is even more paradoxical, if one analyses the actu-
al scope of action of the “Mediator” in each Member State. By stat-
ing that “its mission will be to help citizens of the Union to defend
their rights under the Treaty”, the proposal provides direct authori-
sation not only to deal with the rights granted specifically in the var-
ious Treaty provisions, but also to safeguard the fundamental rights
generally granted under Article 2 of the Proposal.
Article 9 also gives the Ombudsman powers to oversee the admin-
istration of all the bodies responsible for implementing Community
law (...“before the administrative authorities of the Union and its
Member States”...), and fully entitles him to take legal action at the
national and supranational levels (...“[and] to invoke such rights
before judicial bodies, on his own account or in support of the per-
sons concerned”...) 20.
Finally, Article 9 also allows the Ombudsman to deal immediately
and specifically with citizens of the Union in order to provide them
34 Carlos Moreiro González
20 See p. 250 below.
with concise and comprehensive information regarding their rights
and how to implement them.
The Spanish proposal was rejected by the European Parliament and
the Commission, while receiving some support from certain govern-
ment delegations at the IGC. The European Parliament’s opposition
derived mainly from the perceived erosion of its powers based on two
grounds: the absence of the right of petition from the specific citizen-
ship rights contained in Articles 4-9 of the Spanish proposal, and the
possible diminution of the role of the Committee on Petitions follow-
ing the creation of a European “Mediator” or “Ombudsman”.
In this respect, some of the points contained in the European
Parliament’s Resolution on the operation of the Committee on
Petitions in the parliamentary year 1990-1991 21 are particularly
enlightening. Having, in Point 1, affirmed the importance of peti-
tions in the life of the Communities in providing an individual link
with citizens, Points 11, 12 and 13 clearly state Parliament’s opposi-
tion to the creation of a “European Ombudsman” and object, with-
out being specific, to “certain proposals” submitted in this respect to
the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union 22. Point 10 also
highlights the increase in co-operation between the Committee on
Petitions and the “ombudsmen and committees on petitions” of the
national parliaments, and adds that such co-operation provides “an
adequate structure for defending citizens in their relations with the
authorities at national, local and Community level”. Parliament’s
position thus entirely discredits both the need to create an “ombuds-
man” and all three alternatives for doing so contained in the Spanish
Proposal.
A degree of support for the European Parliament’s apocalyptic view
was also to be found in the European Commission. In its proposal of
28 February 1991 23 for a text on Political Union, the Commission
avoided taking a position on the creation of the European
Ombudsman. However, as a reaction to the Danish Proposal in
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21 Resolution of 14 June 1991 on Report A3-0122/91, Official Journal 1991 C 183, 
p. 448.
22 For example, Point 11 states that a “European Ombudsman” will reduce the
power of Parliament and its committees to oversee the Commission, creating a
new structure that would overlap with the Committee on Petitions. And Point 13
states that it would serve only “to undermine the functioning of the institutions”.
23 SEC (91) 412.
March 1991, it advocated establishing a co-operation mechanism
among the “ombudsmen” in the Member States regarding the
emerging subsidiarity principle (thereby avoiding the creation of a
European Ombudsman). Given the more immediate contact which
existed between citizens and their national “ombudsmen” and their
greater familiarity with the intricacies of their respective public
authorities, such a mechanism of co-operation would, in the
Commission’s view, help increase efficiency in monitoring
Community law.
Finally, the draft Treaty presented by the Luxembourg Presidency
to the European Council on 28-29 June 1991 and eventually accept-
ed, included the basic features of the Spanish proposal on citizenship
but not the model for the Defensor (Mediator, Ombudsman) con-
tained in Article 9 of the text 24. Neither the Dutch Presidency’s draft
Treaty of 24 September 1991 nor the final text of the Treaty on
European Union (signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992) made
substantial modifications in this respect.
In summary, the Spanish proposal had the significant merit of antic-
ipating a model of ombudsman which would have been ideal if
implemented at a more advanced stage in the process of political
integration. It was a maximalist, but not very pragmatic, proposal in
terms of clarifying the Ombudsman’s powers and the political
context in which it was formulated. This was perhaps the reason for
opting for the minimalist proposal advocated by the Danish delega-
tion, which only gave the Ombudsman competence to inquire into
possible instances of maladministration in the activities of
Community institutions and bodies 25.
4 Conclusion
The significance of the Spanish contribution to the creation of the
European Ombudsman in the Treaty on European Union lay, above
all, in the fact that it revitalised the idea that the Danes had put for-
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24 Text of the Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council in Europe
Documents, Nos. 1722-1723 (5 July 1991).
25 The proposal to introduce a new Article 140A into the Treaty gave it power “[to]
receive communications from physical and legal persons residing in a Member
State about deficiencies in the institutions’ administration”.
ward during the last phase of the negotiations on the 1986 Single
European Act, but which was not taken on board at the time because
the Danish proposal was made very late in the negotiations at the
Intergovernmental Conference.
Consequently, it also had the merit of launching the debate regard-
ing the need to create this new body, with more support from
Parliament and the European Commission than from the majority of
the delegations representing the governments of the Member States.
While it is true that the February 1991 Spanish proposal for a text
on European citizenship gave the greatest possible powers to the
“Mediator” (or mediators), it is equally certain that it failed to address
questions relating to the delicate institutional balance at the
Community level. No reference was made to its Statute, to how it
would be appointed or elected, to its functional autonomy and to
how it would operate as an institution.
All these are highly important details, which were eventually
addressed in the Danish proposal. The technical and legal skill
underpinning the latter proposal undoubtedly helped ensure the
smooth progress of the political negotiations and, in my view, was the
necessary catalyst for including in the text of the Treaty the model
and specific form of the European Ombudsman that are still in force.
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